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IS THERE A DOCTOR IN THE
HOUSE?: THE DUTY OF A
SUBSTITUTE PHYSICIAN TO
DISCLOSE THE RISKS OF MEDICAL
TREATMENT
Sangiuolo v. LeventhaP
Legal medicine embodies a variety of subjects including informed consent
and the legal effect of relationships between physicians. Viewed separately,
arrangements made between physicians caring for each other's patients and
the doctrine of informed consent generate an abundance of discussion among
legal scholars and members of the medical profession alike.2 When these two
areas are combined, their importance to medicolegal jurisprudence increases
dramatically.
The New York Supreme Court in Sangiuolo v. LeventhaP held that a
substitute physician is liable to a patient for failure to inform that patient of
the risks, benefits and alternatives of a treatment originated by another physi-
cian." In so holding, the court in Leventhal merged the doctrine of informed
consent with that of the legal effect of an arrangement made by a physician
and his substitute. This novel merger5 presents several issues that must be
1. 132 Misc. 2d 680, 505 N.Y.S.2d 507 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
2. In Graddy v. New York Medical College, 19 A.D.2d 426, 428, 243 N.Y.S.2d
940, 942 (1963), the court discussed the importance of determining the legal effect of
arrangements made between physicians for the treatment of the other physician's pa-
tients. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, stated that "[t]he problem
presented is of significance in the practice of medicine and in affecting liability resting
on the arrangements made by physicians for the care and treatment of each others'
patients." Id.
One discussion on the import of the doctrine of informed consent noted: "The
growth and importance of informed consent has been so very significant that some
commentators have observed that it has prompted 'a spate of legal articles that is prob-
ably unequaled in the history of medicolegal jurisprudence."' Comment, Patients'
Rights and Informed Consent: An Emergency Case for Hospitals?, 12 CAL. W.L. REV.
406, 411 n.23 (1976).
3. 132 Misc. 2d 680, 505 N.Y.S.2d 507 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
4. Id. at 684-85, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 508, 510.
5. In Leventhal, the court noted that "[n]either counsel nor the court have found
any American case on the issue of the liability of the substituting physician to provide
informed consent." Id. at 684, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
Further support for the contention that the merger between the doctrine of in-
formed consent and a substitute's liability is novel is warranted by the complete ab-
sence of any discussion on the matter by such frequently cited works as American
Jurisprudence 2d and Corpus Juris Secundum. Although these works do contain discus-
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addressed by New York and other jurisdictions following the decision.
Leventhal involved a defendant doctor's motion for summary judgment in
a medical malpractice action. The events preceding the motion began on Janu-
ary 30, 1978, when Dr. Gerald Leventhal conferred with Ms. Josephine
Sangiuolo concerning complaints of pain in her joints. Dr. Leventhal diag-
nosed the pain as rheumatoid arthritis."
In an effort to curb the disease and prevent further consequences of rheu-
matoid arthritis, Dr. Leventhal prescribed gold therapy.' A note in the office
records of Dr. Leventhal stated: "Patient advised of possible Gold complica-
tions8 but agreeable to Rx."' Dr. Leventhal then began administering gold
injections by utilizing the drug Solganol on April 19, 1978.10
Several weeks later, Dr. Jeffrey Postman agreed to treat Ms. Sangiuolo
while Dr. Leventhal was on vacation. Dr. Postman saw Ms. Sangiuolo on four
occasions-June 29, July 6, July 11, and July 17, 1978.11 When he first saw
Ms. Sangiuolo in his office, Dr. Postman inquired about her condition, per-
sion on both informed consent and the arrangement between a physician and his substi-
tute, they completely lack discussion exists concerning a substitute's duty to inform a
patient of the risks of a treatment started by another physician.
6. Leventhal, 132 Misc. 2d at 681, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 508. Rheumatoid arthritis is
a chronic disease which affects multiple joints of the body creating such effects as de-
bility, weakness and weight loss. Rheumatoid arthritis is accompanied by pain, limita-
tion of motion, deformity and sometimes bony ankylosis which is a complete fixation of
a joint due to the fusion of the bones. BLACKISTON'S NEW GOULD MEDICAL DICTION-
ARY 71, 96 (1949).
7. Because rheumatoid arthritis is a chronic disease which has the potential ef-
fect of severely crippling its victims, mere treatment of the symptoms is insufficient.
The main purpose in the care and treatment of rheumatoid arthritis should be the
prevention or retardation of joint destruction. Luukkainen, Gold in Rheumatoid Ar-
thritis Therapy Today. Early Treatment, 51 SCAND. J. RHEUMATOL. SUPP. 118 (1983).
Gold therapy involves the use of gold, a disease modifying drug. A standardized
regime for gold treatment of rheumatoid arthritis patients who have not previously
been given gold includes: 1) an initial trial period with weekly injections of 10 mg., 25
mg., and 50 mg. respectively; 2) the main phase of the treatment with weekly injections
of 50 mg. which continues until a total gold dose of approximately 1000 mg. is given
(If the treatment fails to produce any apparent effect, such as retardation of joint de-
struction, it is stopped); and 3) the maintenance period with intervals of two to four
weeks between each injection of 50 mg. This part of the treatment can last as long as
the treatment is seen as beneficial. Husby, Gold in Rheumatoid Arthritis Therapy To-
day. Dosage, 51 SCAND. J. RHEUMATOL. SUPP. 122 (1983).
8. The complications of gold therapy include the following: dermatitis, thicken-
ing of the tongue, inflammation of the upper respiratory tract, fainting, dizziness,
sweating, nausea, vomiting, abdominal cramps, diarrhea, as well as several others.
PHYSICIAN's DESK REFERENCE 1808 (38th ed. 1984).
9. Leventhal, 132 Misc. 2d at 681, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
10. Leventhal, 132 Misc. 2d at 681, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 508. Solganol is a sterile
dispersion of a solid particle through a liquid, for intramuscular injection only. Each
ml. of Solganol contains 50 mg. of aurothioglucose. Aurothioglucose contains approxi-
mately 50% gold by weight. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE 1808 (38th ed. 1984).
11. Leventhal, 132 Misc. 2d at 681, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
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formed a urinalysis, conducted a complete blood count analysis (CBC),1 2 and
administered Solganol.13
The remaining consultations between Dr. Postman and Ms. Sangiuolo be-
gan on July 6, when Dr. Postman performed another urinanlysis and adminis-
tered another injection of Solganol. On July 11, Ms. Sanguiolo complained of
a rash. Dr. Postman told her the gold therapy had to stop. He did not adminis-
ter any further injections. On that same date he also treated her with several
medications and did another CBC analysis. Finally, Dr. Postman last ex-
amined Ms. Sangiuolo on July 17, at which time he adjusted her medication.14
Ms. Sangiuolo eventually sued both Dr. Leventhal and Dr. Postman,
claiming that the doctors were guilty of negligence by failing to inform her of
the risks of gold therapy despite the note in Dr. Leventhal's records stating
that the patient had been so advised. 15 Ms. Sangiuolo also sued Dr. Postman
for medical malpractice, claiming that he acted negligently when he failed to
do a CBC analysis on July 6.16 The New York court granted summary judg-
ment for Dr. Postman on this issue, noting the absence of any genuine issue of
material effect concerning negligence in Dr. Postman's conduct on July 6.17
Dr. Postman suggested two arguments in support of his request for sum-
mary judgment on the issue of his negligence in failing to inform Ms.
Sangiuolo of the risks of gold therapy. First, Dr. Postman insisted that he was
entitled to rely upon the notation in Dr. Leventhal's records that Ms.
Sangiuolo had been advised of the complications that might accompany the
gold treatment.1 8 Dr. Postman further argued that a decision forcing substi-
tutes to inform patients of risks of a treatment started by another physician
would make it increasingly difficult for vacationing doctors to procure
substitutes."9
The New York court rejected both arguments, concluding that a substi-
tute has a duty to inform.20 The case is the first American decision to discuss
12. A complete blood count analysis is a blood count made from a combination
of the following determinations: red blood cell count, white blood cell count, erythro-
cyte indices, hematocrit and differential blood count. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTION-
ARY (5th Unabridged Lawyer's ed. 1982).
13. Leventhal, 132 Misc. 2d at 681, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
14. Id.
15. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
16. Leventhal, 132 Misc. 2d at 681, 505 N.Y.S.2d 508.
17. The court reasoned that the failure to take blood on that date:
could not have been a proximate cause of plaintiff's rash because the CBC
analysis of the blood taken on June 29 was normal, so that [Dr. Postman] was
justified in giving the July 6 injection. The next time he saw plaintiff, the rash
had already appeared, and he did not administer any further injections.
Id. The malpractice part of the case was quickly dismissed by the New York Supreme
Court and will not be discussed further in this Note. What is of noteworthy significance
is the court's treatment of the informed consent issue.
18. Id.
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and recognize a substitute physician's duty to inform a patient of the risks of
treatment that the substitute administers while covering for the original
physician.21
The doctrine of informed consent is founded on the strong contemporary
concern for the right of the individual to be the sole determiner of his own
destiny.2 2 The court in Leventhal demonstrated its recognition of this concern
when it relied upon the statement of Justice Cardozo in Schloendorff v. Soci-
ety of New York Hospital: "[e]very human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body."23 Indi-
viduals have an interest in their own destiny and this interest is as applicable
in medical matters as it is in any other aspect of human activity.2 4
To ensure that the patient is allowed to control his own destiny, a physi-
cian must obtain not merely the consent of his patient, but the patient's in-
formed consent.25 The issue thus concerns what information a patient requires
to enable him to make an informed decision. That issue was addressed in the
landmark case of Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trust-
ees.2 6 The Salgo court concluded that "the facts necessary to form the basis of
an intelligent consent" are the ones which must be disclosed to the patient.27
However, claiming that those "facts necessary to form the basis of an intelli-
gent consent" must be disclosed only begs the question. What facts are neces-
sary to form the basis of an intelligent consent? 28
21. See supra note 5.
22. Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Bal-
ance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. REv 413,
422.
23. Leventhal, 132 Misc. 2d at 683, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 509 (quoting Schloendorff
v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914), rev'd sub
nom. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 665 (1957)).
24. Meisel, supra note 22, at 418.
25. Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 227 N.W.2d
647, 652 (1975). The Scaria court stated that "a patient [has] a right to know of
significant potential risks involved in proposed treatment or surgery so that he [can]
make a rational and informed decision of whether he would undergo the proposed pro-
cedures." Id.; see also Meisel, supra note 22, at 420-21.
26. 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
27. Id. at 578, 317 P.2d at 181.
28. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(l) (McKinney 1985); Charley v.
Cameron, 215 Kan. 750, 756, 528 P.2d 1205, 1210 (1974) ("the duty of a physician is
limited to those disclosures which a reasonable medical practitioner would make under
the same or similar circumstances"); Ze Barth v. Swedish Hosp., 81 Wash. 2d 12, 24,
499 P.2d 1, 8 (1972) ("Informed consent, therefore, is the name for a general principle
of law that a physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably prudent physician in
the medical community, in the exercise of reasonable care, would disclose to his pa-
tient."); see also Garone v. Robert's Technical & Trade School, Inc., 47 A.D.2d 306,
308, 366 N.Y.S.2d 129, 131 (1975). The Garone court said: "[The physician] is under
an affirmative duty to make a reasonable disclosure to his patient of the known dangers
which are incident to or possible in the proposed treatment; if he fails in that duty he
can be liable for malpractice. . . ." Id.
[Vol. 53
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In the Leventhal case the court noted that the doctrine of informed con-
sent had been incorporated in New York Public Health Law section 2805-
d(1). 29 The doctrine of informed consent, as it pertains to the law governing
the Leventhal decision, places liability upon a physician who fails to disclose
those risks which a reasonable medical practitioner would have disclosed under
similar circumstances.
3 0
According to the court in Leventhal, liability has generally been premised
upon two theories: 1) nonconsensual touching of the body; and 2) a form of
medical malpractice.3 1 If liability is premised upon a nonconsensual touching
of the body, recovery may be had even where an operation is successful.3 2
Generally, however, a physician's failure to procure a patient's informed con-
sent is regarded as a species of malpractice.33
Regardless of the theory used, a physician who fails to inform a patient of
the risks, benefits and alternatives to a proposed treatment subjects himself to
liability.34 This liability, however, is not absolute.3 5 In Prooth v. Wallsh, 0 the
court held that the duty to inform must be limited regardless of the theory
used to find liability. If the nonconsensual touching theory is applied, the
29. The statute provides that:
Lack of informed consent means the failure of the person providing the pro-
fessional treatment or diagnosis to disclose to the patient such alternatives
thereto and the reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits involved as a reason-
able medical practitioner under similar circumstances would have disclosed,
in a manner permitting the patient to make a knowledgeable evaluation.
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(1) (McKinney 1985).
30. See supra notes 28-29.
31. Leventhal, 132 Misc. 2d at 683, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 509; see also Prooth v.
Wallsh, 105 Misc. 2d 603, 432 N.Y.S.2d 663 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
32. The court in Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 74 (1965)
stated: "If the consent given to the operation in question was ineffectual, every phase of
this operation, from initial anesthesia to final suture was a continuing battery for which
recovery should be allowed, even if the operation had been successful." Id. at 366, 409
P.2d at 82.
33. 132 Misc. 2d at 683, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
34. "A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to liability
if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent
by the patient to the proposed treatment." Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of
Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957); see supra notes 28-29.
35. Liability is not absolute despite the fact that:
Traditionally, the law of informed consent has been seen by jurists through
'tunnel vision' eyes. Regardless of the presence of extenuating circumstances,
courts have held that the physician is bound by an absolute duty to disclose
all relevant information to his patient concerning the proposed surgical opera-
tion or course of treatment.
Meisel, supra note 22, at 417 n.17 (quoting Abbuhl & Gerking, Informed Consent of
the Emotionally Disturbed Patient, 1975 LEGAL MED. ANN. 217, 220 (C. Wecht ed.
1976)). Meisel points out that the case, Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Haw. 188, 473 P.2d 116
(1970), which was used to support the absolute duty to disclose, does not hold that
there is an absolute duty of disclosure. Meisel, supra note 22, at 417 n.17.
36. 105 Misc. 2d 603, 432 N.Y.S.2d 663 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
1988]
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Prooth court said that only the party who actually touches or directs such
touching should be liable.3 7 If the malpractice theory is applied, then every
participant in a procedure may be liable to explain the particular risks of his
part of the treatment, but not necessarily the risks of another participant's
treatment.38
In addition to the limitations of the informed consent doctrine set forth by
the Prooth court, several other limitations in the form of exceptions have been
developed.39 These exceptions include: 1) emergencies precluding the obtaining
of consent; 2) incompetent patients who are not capable of giving an intelli-
gent consent; 3) waiver of the information needed for consent by the patient;
and 4) the therapeutic privilege, which allows an exception to the doctrine
where withholding the requisite information is actually beneficial to the pa-
tient.40 One court has also concluded that informed consent is required before
a surgical operation but that the doctrine does not apply to therapeutic
treatment.
41
In its most basic form, the doctrine of informed consent places upon a
physician the duty to disclose information which a reasonably prudent physi-
cian would disclose.42 The Leventhal decision does not change the doctrine.
Instead, Leventhal applies the doctrine of informed consent to a new area-a
substitute's duty to disclose. Understanding this doctrine and its exceptions is,
therefore, an essential step in properly analyzing the Leventhal decision.
Since the decision in Leventhal also depends in part upon the legal effect
of an arrangement between physicians caring for each others' patients,'43 more
than an understanding of the doctrine of informed consent is necessary. One
must also comprehend the different legal effects that surround arrangements
between physicians.4 4
The courts of New York and other states have considered the relationship
between the original treating physician and his substitute.45 These courts rely
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. For a detailed examination of these exceptions, see Meisel, supra note 22.
40. Id.
41. In Malloy v. Shanahan, 421 A.2d 803 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980), the court
stated, "[Informed consent] has not been extended to therapeutic treatment, which is
usually an ongoing treatment upon examination by the treating physician, where any
change of condition can be diagnosed and controlled." Id. at 804.
42. See supra notes 28-29.
43. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
44. The term "legal effects," as used here, refers to the relationship that the
arrangement creates and the liability, if any, stemming from such relationship (i.e.
master-servant, partnership or independent contractor).
45. Leventhal, 132 Misc. 2d at 684, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 510; see, e.g., Nash v.
Royster, 189 N.C. 408, 127 S.E. 356 (1935); Impastato v. DeGirolamo, 117 Misc. 2d
786, 459 N.Y.S.2d 512, aft'd, 464 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1983); Prooth v. Wallsh, 105 Misc.
2d 603, 432 N.Y.S.2d 663 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980); Graddy v. New York Medical Col-
lege, 19 A.D.2d 426, 243 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1963); Moulten v. Huckleberry, 150 Or. 538,
46 P.2d 589 (1935); McCay v. Mitchell, 463 S.W.2d 710 (Tenn. 1970).
[Vol. 53
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upon a number of factors in determining whether the relationship between the
two physicians is one of partners, master-servant, or independent practition-
ers 86 A determination of the type of relationship existing between the physi-
cians is essential since the degree of liability turns upon the nature of that
relationship.47
In determining whether a partnership exists, courts will look to see
whether there is a pro rata sharing of profits and losses of the enterprise and
pro rata contribution to the capital of the enterprise.48 In addition, other fac-
tors suggesting the existence of a partnership between the physicians include
joint ownership and interest in the enterprise assets, intent of the parties to be
partners, and equal voice in the management of the enterprise by the parties.49
Where the substitute physician has no obligation to bear the burden of any
loss suffered by the original physician no partnership or joint venture is
established.50
The New York Supreme Court relied upon these factors in Impastato v.
DeGirolamo"1 to determine whether a partnership existed between a physician
and his substitute. In that case, Frances Impastato took her eleven year old
son to Dr. Paul Citrin in January, 1979.52 On June 19, 1979, she took her son
back to see Dr. Citrin but Dr. Citrin was on vacation. Dr. Mehta was seeing
Citrin's patients.53 Dr. Mehta examined Mrs. Impastato's son and diagnosed
his condition as acute gastritis. Mrs. Impastato's son was actually suffering
from appendicitis and died June 21, 1979, from a perforated appendix.5
Mrs. Impastato sued both Dr. Citrin and Dr. Mehta, contending, among
other things, that the relationship between Citrin and Mehta had evolved to
the level of a partnership.5 5 The court relied upon the factors discussed above
in determining that Mehta and Citrin were not partners. The Impastato court
found that Dr. Mehta did not have an obligation to incur any losses that Cit-
rin's practice might suffer." In addition, the court determined that Mehta did
not have any control over Dr. Citrin's office or practice.57 Based on these con-
clusions, the court held that Mehta and Citrin were not involved in a
partnership. 8
Just as the factors suggesting a partnership are numerous, so too are the
46. Leventhal, 132 Misc. 2d at 684, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 510; see, e.g., Impastato,
117 Misc. 2d 786, 459 N.Y.S.2d 512; Huckleberry, 150 Or. 538, 46 P.2d 589.
47. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
48. Impastato, 117 Misc. 2d at 789, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 786, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
51. 117 Misc. 2d 786, 459 N.Y.S.2d 512 (1983).
52. Id. at 786, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 787, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
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factors supporting an agency or master-servant relationship59 The factors re-
lied upon in determining whether the arrangement between a physician and
his substitute is one of master-servant or agency include the arrangements
made for payment between the original physician and his substitute; whether
the substitute makes use of the original physician's premises, materials, equip-
ment, appliances and staff; the contract made between the parties; the original
physician's right to terminate the employment; the original physician's right to
direct how the work should be done; and whether the substitute was employed
to handle a specific case as opposed to being hired to do all the work of the
original physician. 60 If the original physician turns over his office, equipment,
staff and files, and the substitute turns over the fees collected, then a master-
servant relationship is created. 1
The Impastato court considered these factors in determining whether a
master-servant relationship existed. While the court held a partnership did not
exist,62 the court did find a master-servant relationship.6 3 That finding was
based on the fact that Dr. Mehta, who was substituting for Dr. Citrin, used
Dr. Citrin's equipment to perform her services.6 Dr. Mehta did not have any
tools or equipment of her own. She even used the prescription pads furnished
by Dr. Citrin.65 In addition, Dr. Mehta was obliged to use Citrin's staff. The
patients she treated were to remain Citrin's patients. Furthermore, she only
received a portion of the compensation paid by insured patients (i.e. Medicaid,
Blue Cross, Blue Shield). Finally, Dr. Citrin could dismiss Dr. Mehta at any
time.66 The Impastato court held that the combination of these factors was
evidence that Dr. Mehta was an employee of Dr. Citrin.6 7
In the absence of any factors suggesting a special relationship between
the original physician and his substitute, it must be assumed that the physi-
cians are independent contractors. 8 In Moore v. Lee,69 the Texas Supreme
59. "Although the words agent and servant are not wholly synonymous there is
no fundamental distinction between the liability of a principal for the tort of an agent
and the liability of a master for the tort of a servant." Id. at 790, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
60. Moulten v. Huckleberry, 150 Or. 538, 46 P.2d 589 (1935).
61. Impastato v. DeGirolamo, 117 Misc. 2d 786, 793, 459 N.Y.S.2d 512, 517
(1983); see also McCay v. Mitchell, 62 Tenn. App. 424, 463 S.W.2d 710 (1970) (the
court found a master-servant relationship). In Mitchell, the original physician had been
hired to treat the plaintiff during her pregnancy and childbirth. When the plaintiff was
hospitalized for her accouchement, the original physician was absent. He had arranged
for the plaintiff to be cared for by another doctor, who was not known to the plaintiff.
The court held that these facts permitted the inference of an agency. Id. at 433, 463
S.W.2d at 715.
62. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
63. Impastato, 117 Misc. 2d at 791, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
64. Id. at 791, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 791, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
68. Leventhal, 132 Misc. 2d at 684, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
69. 109 Tex. 391, 211 S.W. 214 (1919).
[Vol. 53
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Court stated that "[f]rom the very nature of the employment, the physician
who takes the place of another must, while he alone is treating the patient,
exercise his own judgment and his own skill; and he is truly an independent
contractor.17 0
The legal effect of an arrangement between a physician and his substitute
(i.e. partnership, master-servant, independent contractor) affects the liability
of those involved.7 1 The determination of the legal effect of the arrangement
is, therefore, a vital step in determining the liability of a substitute for failure
to disclose risks of a treatment.
If the physicians are partners, or are jointly employed, both the substitute
and the original physician will be liable if the original physician failed to dis-
close the information needed for a patient's informed consent.7 2 This rule re-
quires the substitute, who is a partner with the original physician, to establish
that the risks of the treatment were disclosed to the patient. Under the theory
that failure to inform results in a nonconsensual touching, the substitute is
liable for the original physician's failure to disclose the required information,
even if the substitute later provides the patient with the information necessary
for making an intelligent decision concerning consent.73 The partnership ar-
rangement, then, charges the substitute with a duty to make sure the risks of
the treatment were disclosed to the patient.
Even if there were no partnership between the doctors, the substitute
could still be liable for the failure of the original physician to inform the pa-
tient if the physicians were jointly employed. The general rule is that physi-
cians employed together by the patient and diagnosing or treating the case
together owe the same duty and are jointly liable for any negligence."'
70. Id. at 395, 211 S.W. at 215.
71. While the proposition that liability is dependent upon the nature of the rela-
tionship will undoubtedly be established through the cases that follow, the proposition
is also suggested by the court's earlier invitation to the parties in the Leventhal case to
explore the relation between Dr. Leventhal and Dr. Postman. Such an invitation seems
useless unless the court thought the nature of the relationship had some bearing on
liability.
72. While it will be seen from the pertinent cases that the reverse of this state-
ment is true - that the original physician is liable for negligent omissions made by the
substitute - this Note does not address the original physician's liability for a substi-
tute's negligence. That issue is adequately addressed elsewhere. See, e.g., Annotation,
Liability of One Physician or Surgeon for Malpractice of Another, 85 A.L.R.2D 889
(1962); Annotation, Vicarious Liability of Physicians for Negligence of Another, 38
AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts 445 (1984). Instead, this Note is only concerned with a
substitute's duty to dispense information concerning the risks, benefits and alternatives
of the prescribed treatment.
73. Graddy v. New York Medical College, 19 A.D.2d 426, 243 N.Y.S.2d 940
(1963); see also supra note 32 (suggesting liability under the battery approach even if
the operation were successful). Thus, recovery would be allowed from the time the
original physician should have informed his patient to the time the substitute actually
did inform the patient.
74. "Where physicians actually participate together in diagnosis and treatment,
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Where the physicians are jointly employed or are partners, the fact that
the substitute provides the patient with the information becomes irrelevant if
the original physician failed in his duty. 5 A different result occurs if the rela-
tionship is characterized as one of a master-servant. The decision in Prooth v.
Wallsh,'7 6 for instance, noted that although "many participants touched the
patient's body during the course of the operative procedure ... [i]t cannot be
seriously contended that each participant has a duty to inform the patient of
the risks, prior to obtaining consent to the procedure."''
That the substitute may not have a duty to disclose information if he is a
servant is particulary true under the theory that the doctrine of informed con-
sent is grounded in nonconsensual touching of the body.78 Under that theory,
liability is limited to the person touching or directing the touching.79 While at
first glance it may appear that mere touching is enough to establish liability,
the Prooth decision held that touching alone should not warrant liability.80
Since under the master-servant theory the original physician directs the touch-
ing, the argument may be made that a substitute, who is following another
doctor's orders, is not liable.
The relationships previously discussed involve situations where the origi-
nal physician and the substitute worked together in some capacity (i.e. part-
ners, joint employees, or master-servant). Another possible relationship be-
tween the physician and his substitute is that of independent contractors. If
the arrangement is one of independent contractors the duty, and therefore lia-
bility, is different from that of the partnership or master-servant relationship.
The general rule concerning independent contractors is that "one is not
liable for the malpractice of the other, in the absence of evidence that he ob-
served the wrongful act or omission [of the other], or in the exercise of ordi-
nary care, should have observed it."81 Since the substitute is an independent
they may each incur a liability for the negligence of the other even though a more
active part in the treatment may have been taken by one of them. . . ." Graddy, 19
A.D.2d at 429, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 943.
75. The substitute's actions are irrelevant in the sense that he will still be liable.
See supra notes 72-74.
76. 105 Misc. 2d 603, 432 N.Y.S.2d 663 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
77. Id. at 605, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 664-55; see also Bell v. Umstattd, 401 S.W.2d
306 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). The Bell court stated:
Surgical operation may consist of many steps and involve many specialists. It
would, indeed, be unreasonable and undesirable to place a burden of full and
complete disclosure upon each and every specialist involved as to the specific
methods intended to be used in an operation and all of the possible risks in-
volved in each step of an operation.
Id. at 313.
78. See supra text accompanying note 31-32.
79. See supra text accompanying note 37.
80. Prooth v. Wallsh, 105 Misc. 2d 603, 432 N.Y.S.2d 663 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1980).
81. See, e.g., Brooker v. Hunter, 22 Ariz. App. 510, 515, 528 P.2d 1269, 1274
(1975); Graddy v. New York Medical College, 19 A.D.2d 426, 428, 243 N.Y.S.2d 940,
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contractor, any new treatment prescribed by him must be accompanied with
disclosure of the risks of such treatment to the patient.82 Consider the situa-
tion of a woman who is being treated by a substitute physician for an eye
infection. If the substitute should also decide the woman needs ear surgery, it
would be incumbent upon him, as an independent practitioner, to inform her
of the risks of such surgery. The ear surgery is a new treatment prescribed by
him and as such requires his disclosure of the risks associated with that
surgery.83
Having considered the legal nature of the doctrine of informed consent
and the legal effects of the relationship between practicing physicians,8 this
Note now examines the Leventhal case to see how the New York court applied
current law to the fact situation presented.
The court in Leventhal first declared Dr. Postman to be an independent
"practitioner." 85 The court made this decision without any input from the par-
ties involved in this relationship. 86 The only information the court had in at-
tempting to determine the type of relationship was that Dr. Leventhal and Dr.
Postman had offices in the same building and that Ms. Sangiuolo made pay-
ments directly to Dr. Postman." Based upon these limited facts, the court
reasonably concluded that Leventhal and Postman were independent
practitioners.88
From the facts given, finding a partnership between Leventhal and Post-
man would require a great deal of imagination.89 First, the facts give no indi-
cation that the doctors shared profits.90 Second, there is no indication that
942 (1963).
82. Prooth v. Wallsh, 105 Misc. 2d 603, 432 N.Y.S.2d 663 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1980); see also Nisenholtz v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 126 Misc. 2d 658, 483 N.Y.S.2d 568(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984). The court in Nisenholtz noted:[I]t is clearly not necessary that every physician or health care provider who
becomes involved with a patient obtain informed consent to every medical
procedure to which the patient submits. Rather, it is the responsibility of a
physician to obtain informed consent to those procedures and treatments
which the physician actually prescribes or performs.
Id. at 663, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
83. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
85. Leventhal, 132 Misc. 2d at 684, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
86. The court invited the parties to explore the relationship. The parties, how-




89. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text (discussing factors used in
establishing a partnership).
90. The fact that Ms. Sangiuolo paid Dr. Leventhal while he was treating her
and then paid Dr. Postman while he was substituting for Dr. Leventhal is some indica-




Groves: Groves: Is There a Doctor in the House
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1988
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Leventhal and Postman were joint owners in the enterprise assets. 91 In addi-
tion, the other factors often considered in finding a partnership were not pre-
sent in the Leventhal case. The evidence did not show any intent to form a
partnership. There did not appear to be equal voice in management as there
were no common managerial duties. Finally, there was no basis for believing
that Dr. Postman, acting as a substitute, had any obligation to bear any loss
suffered by Dr. Leventhal.92 If a relationship existed between Dr. Postman and
Dr. Leventhal, it was not a partnership.
The court also determined the relationship was not one of master-ser-
vant.93 The court's conclusion, again, appears to be a correct analysis when
one considers the factors that establish a master-servant relationship. 9' First,
payments were made directly to Dr. Postman, not Dr. Leventhal."5 Further-
more, the facts give no indication that Dr. Postman used any of Dr.
Leventhal's equipment.9" In fact, when Dr. Postman saw Ms. Sangiuolo, he
saw her in his office and not in Dr. Leventhal's office.9 7 The facts support the
court's conclusion that no master-servant relationship existed.
What the New York court did find in Leventhal were two independent
practitioners who had made arrangements that one would take care of the
other's patients. 98 This finding seems proper in light of the analysis used in
Moore v. Lee.99 In the Leventhal case, the facts suggest that when Dr. Post-
man took the place of Dr. Leventhal, Dr. Postman alone was treating the pa-
tient. 100 Dr. Postman was exercising his own judgment and his own skill and
was truly an independent contractor. 10
After determining that Dr. Leventhal and Dr. Postman were independent
practitioners, the court turned its attention to the duty of Dr. Postman to dis-
close the risks of gold therapy to Ms. Sangiuolo.10 2 The New York court then
stated that "the rationales that have been considered to underly the informed
consent doctrine mandate this court's holding that Dr. Postman, as an inde-
pendent provider of medical care, had the obligation to inform Ms. Sangiuolo
91. The very fact that the doctors had separate offices in the same building
might suggest an absence of joint ownership. In fact, it would appear that each doctor
had ownership in a separate enterprise.
92. Leventhal, 132 Misc. 2d at 684, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
93. Id.
94. These factors are discussed supra in notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
95. Leventhal, 132 Misc. 2d at 684, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 681, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
98. Id. at 681, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
99. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
100. Leventhal, 132 Misc. 2d at 681, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
101. That Dr. Postman was exercising his own judgment and skill is evidenced in
part by the fact that upon hearing of the complaints of a rash, he told Ms. Sangiuolo
that the gold therapy had to stop. In addition, Dr. Postman treated her with several
medications and adjusted the medication without any evidence that Dr. Leventhal was
advising him on how to treat Ms. Sangiuolo. Id. at 681, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
102. Id. at 684, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
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of the risks, benefits and alternatives to the treatment that he was going to
administer."103
The Leventhal decision makes it clear that a substitute physician has the
duty to provide a patient with enough facts necessary to form the basis of an
informed consent to the treatment.104 The court, however, appears to have
found this duty by viewing the doctrine of informed consent through "tunnel
vision" eyes. 0° In determining whether or not Dr. Postman could be found
liable the court stated:
If, at trial, it is determined that Dr. Leventhal appropriately warned Ms.
Sangiuolo of the risks of the gold therapy, Dr. Postman will be a beneficiary
of that finding. If the finding is one of a lack of informed consent then... Dr.
Postman will have relied on Dr. Leventhal's entry at his peril. 06
This statement by the court does not allow for extenuating circumstances
such as those which would bring the limitations to the doctrine of informed
consent into focus.101 Nor does the statement take into account what a reason-
ably prudent physician would do under similar circumstances. Instead, the
Leventhal decision makes Dr. Postman's duty to disclose absolute unless the
disclosure was already given by Dr. Leventhal. If Dr. Leventhal failed to warn
Ms. Sangiuolo of the risks of gold therapy, then Dr. Postman is liable.108
If the purpose of the court's ruling is, indeed, to place an absolute duty
upon the substitute physician, then vital principles of the informed consent
doctrine are ignored. Inherent in the doctrine of informed consent is the idea
that the physician must only disclose that information which the reasonable
medical practitioner under similar circumstances would have disclosed.109 To
determine what the reasonable medical practitioner under similar circum-
stances would have disclosed requires medical testimony.110 Yet, the Leventhal
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See supra note 35. While the court does not use the word "absolute," the
effect is the same. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
106. Leventhal, 132 Misc. 2d at 684-85, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
107. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
108. Leventhal, 132 Misc. 2d at 684-85, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
109. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. The New York court in
Leventhal should have been aware that the standard is what the reasonable medical
practitioner under similar circumstances would have disclosed. This is stated in N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(1) (McKinney 1985) which the court cites in its opinion.
Leventhal, 132 Misc. 2d at 683, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
110. The court in Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965), stated:
Without the aid of expert medical testimony in this case a jury could not,
without resorting to conjecture and surmise or by setting up an arbitrary stan-
dard of their own, determine that defendants failed to exercise their skill and
use the care exercised by the ordinary skillful, careful and prudent physician
acting under the same or similar circumstances.
Id. at 674 (quoting Fisher v. Wilkinson, 382 S.W.2d 627, 632 (Mo. 1964)); see also
Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1974); Warner v. New York Cent. Ry., 23
A.D.2d 642, 256 N.Y.S.2d 969 (1965); Johnson v. Whitehurst, 652 S.W.2d 441 (Tex.
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decision seems to hold the substitute liable regardless of what the medical tes-
timony might provide."" That the Leventhal decision appears to hold the sub-
stitute liable despite any evidence of medical testimony stating otherwise is
evidenced by the court's treatment of Dr. Postman's argument that he was
entitled to rely on the notation made in Dr. Leventhal's charts which stated
that Ms. Sangiuolo had been informed of the risks of gold therapy."12
The court first dismissed Dr. Postman's argument by stating that a right
to rely does not matter if there is no duty to inform."13 The court's comment
makes little sense in light of its having already found that Dr. Postman had a
duty to inform." 4 The court then claimed that if Dr. Postman relied on the
notation in Dr. Leventhal's records he did so at his own peril." 5 The court
provided no authority for its conclusion. The court did not say why Dr. Post-
man was not entitled to rely; it simply concluded he was not so entitled.1 6
This conclusion ignores the importance of medical testimony since the question
really should be whether the reasonable medical practitioner would rely on a
note made in another physician's records that informed consent had been
given.
To answer this question, one need search no further than the Federal
Rules of Evidence."' The advisory comments to the Federal Rules of Evidence
indicate that doctors rely upon others' charts-even to the extent of making
life-and-death decisions. 1 8 Case law also recognizes that physicians frequently
rely upon medical notations made by others." 9 In Huffman v. Lindquist,10 a
doctor had interns and nurses make reports which he then relied upon to de-
cide treatment. The court held that "[tihere was no showing that defendant
Ct. App. 1983); Ze Barth v. Swedish Hosp., 81 Wash. 2d 12, 499 P.2d 1 (1972).
111. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
112. Leventhal, 132 Misc. 2d at 682, 684-85, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 508, 510.




117. New York follows Federal Rule of Evidence 703. See People v. Sugden, 35
N.Y.2d 453, 363 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1974).
118. The exact wording of the comment to Rule 703 is: "[A] physician in his
own practice bases his diagnosis on information from numerous sources and of consid-
erable variety, including statements by patients and relatives, reports and opinions from
nurses, technicians and other doctors, hospital records, and X rays.... The physician
makes life-and-death decisions in reliance upon them." FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory
comments.
119. See, e.g., Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1974) (team members of
surgical unit are entitled to rely on consent obtained by doctors in charge of operation);
Brooker v. Hunter, 22 Ariz. App. 510, 528 P.2d 1269 (1975) (court found absolute
right to rely on doctor's opinion that patient was fair risk for surgery); In re G.S., 698
P.2d 406 (Mont. 1985) (reliance upon a psychiatrist's report); Donavant v. Hodspeth,
318 N.C. 1, 347 S.E.2d 797 (1986) (reliance upon a catheterization report); Borden v.
Brady, 92 A.D.2d 983, 461 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1983) (Yesawich, J., concurring) (reliance
upon a neurologist's report).
120. 37 Cal. 2d 465, 234 P.2d 34 (1951) (en banc).
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doctor's reliance on these charts was inconsistent with standard medical prac-
tice. . .."1,21
Applying the above analysis to the Leventhal decision, Dr. Postman could
only be found liable if his reliance on Dr. Leventhal's charts was inconsistent
with standard medical practice. No evidence suggests Dr. Postman acted un-
reasonably when he relied on the information contained in the medical
records. Nevertheless, the New York court would find Dr. Postman liable re-
gardless of the standard medical practice.'22
The desireability of considering the standard medical practice of relying
on another physician's notes is just one of the reasons not to impose an abso-
lute duty of disclosure on a substitute. Other reasons have their foundations in
the exceptions to the doctrine of informed consent. 123 These exceptions were
not discussed in the Leventhal case-probably because they were not raised. 12 4
Still, the exceptions provide important considerations to those jurisdictions
which may follow the Leventhal lead.
One exception to the doctrine of informed consent is the doctrine's limita-
tion to surgical operations . 25 This exception suggests that if the treatment is
not a surgical operation-for instance, if the treatment is purely therapeutic in
nature-then no duty for informed consent would exist. 26 On its face, this
exception would seem to apply to the facts in Leventhal. The treatment in
Leventhal was gold therapy rather than a surgical operation. 127 Under the
cases cited in Leventhal, however, this exception would not relieve a substitute
of his duty to inform inasmuch as a prior case had held that there was a duty
to disclose the risks of gold therapy.12 8 This exception, while not applicable in
121. Id. at 479, 234 P.2d at 43.
122. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text. If Dr. Postman knew that
Dr. Leventhal had, upon previous occasions, failed to disclose risks of a treatment to a
patient, Dr. Postman could then be liable. This is true without regard to what was
written in Dr. Leventhal's notes. See Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 227
N.E.2d 296 (1967). In Fiorentino, the court refused to find a hospital liable for the
failure of an independently retained healer to provide pertinent information concerning
treatment unless the hospital had reason to know the malpractice would take place. Id.
at 415, 227 N.E.2d at 299. The Fiorentino court stated, "Nor would it be fair to im-
pose such an unprecedented liability on a hospital in the absence of facts bringing
home to the hospital ... that in previous instances the surgeon had failed to obtain
informed consent." Id. at 417, 227 N.E.2d at 301.
123. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
124. Dr. Postman only raised two issues in his motion for summary judgment.
First, he claimed he was entitled to rely on Dr. Leventhal's records. Second, he argued
that vacationing doctors would find it more difficult to secure substitutes. Leventhal,
132 Misc. 2d at 684, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 509-10. The Leventhal case gives no indication
that Dr. Postman raised any other issues than those mentioned above.
125. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
126. Id.
127. Leventhal, 132 Misc. 2d at 681, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
128. See DiRosse v. Wein, 24 A.D.2d 510, 261 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1965).
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New York,12 9 may still apply in those jurisdictions which limit the doctrine of
informed consent to surgical operations.
One exception which does seem applicable is that of the "therapeutic
privilege.""' The "therapeutic privilege" allows the physician to withhold in-
formation if disclosure would be harmful to the patient.1 31 The privilege is
applicable to all physicians in cases where appropriate circumstances mandate
withholding the information, such as where the patient is mentally disturbed
or is abnormally apprehensive."3 2 The therapeutic exception might be particu-
larly applicable in the situation where the substitute is continuing a treatment.
In these cases, the substitute would probably disclose information which had
already been disclosed by the original physician, thereby increasing the chance
of frightening the patient.1 33
Under the therapeutic exception there is no duty to inform if the patient
becomes overly frightened to the point that disclosure is harmful. 3 4 "The doc-
trine of informed consent does not require the doctor to risk frightening the
patient out of a course of treatment which sound medical judgment dictates
the patient should undertake."' 3 By implying that the substitute's duty to dis-
close is absolute, the Leventhal decision ignores the principle that there is no
duty to disclose if such disclosure would frighten the patient to the point that
he forecloses rational decision making.
Not only is a physician protected if he fails to provide facts of a treatment
when knowledge of such facts may be harmful to the patient, the physician
may actually be liable for damages if he discloses those harmful facts. That a
physician may be liable for informing a patient of medical risks is evidenced
by the case of Ferrara v. Galluchio.3 6 In Ferrara, the court affirmed a judg-
ment which included $15,000 for anguish incurred by the plaintiff when a
129. Id.
130. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
131. Meisel, supra note 22, at 460.
132. Id. at 462.
133. After the Leventhal decision, the substitute, in order to protect himself
against liability, would have to disclose the risks of the treatment regardless of the
original physician's actions. Thus, under situations where the substitute merely contin-
ues the treatment, he informs the patient of risks the patient has probably been made
aware of. This overdose of disclosure may frighten the patient to the point that he
forecloses a rational decision. See, e.g., Cantebury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). "[I]t is recognized that patients occasion-
ally become so ill or emotionally distraught on disclosure so as to foreclose a rational
decision." Id. at 779.
134. Meisel, supra note 22, at 460.
135. Ze Barth v. Swedish Hosp., 81 Wash. 2d 12, 25-26, 499 P.2d 1, 9-10
(1972); see also Watson v. Clutts, 262 N.C. 153, 136 S.E.2d 617 (1964). In Watson,
the plaintiff had been advised of the risks of the operation by her family physician. The
court found that the surgeon did not need to provide more information, stating that "to
send a patient to the operating room nervous from fright is not often desireable." Id. at
159, 136 S.E.2d at 621.
136. 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249 (1958).
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second physician informed the patient that skin lesions, resulting from a first
physician's malpractice, could become cancerous. 137 Under Ferrara, a substi-
tute physician could actually become liable for any additional disclosure by
him which frightened the patient.
Two other situations exist where the therapeutic privilege might effect the
substitute's liability. The first one of these is where the original physician de-
cides not to disclose under the therapeutic privilege."38 While no case law ex-
ists on the subject, reason would suggest that if an original physician is enti-
tled to rely upon the therapeutic privilege, a substitute would also be entitled
to rely on the privilege. Under a strict reading of the Leventhal decision, how-
ever, a substitute would be liable even if the disclosure of information would
frighten the patient.1 9 Holding a substitute liable under this situation would
produce the strange result that the original physician who started the treat-
ment would be free from liability while his substitute would bear total respon-
sibility should the patient become frightened.
The other situation where the therapeutic privilege is applicable to a sub-
stitute's liability occurs when the original physician actually discloses the risks
of the treatment and the patient becomes extremely upset.140 No better scena-
rio exists for application of the therapeutic privilege. Yet, if the Leventhal
decision stands for the proposition that a substitute has an absolute duty to
disclose, then the substitute would, be liable.141
The last issue the Leventhal court addressed in its opinion concerned Dr.
Postman's argument that "the imposition of liability on a substituting doctor
will make it more difficult for physicians to find others to cover for them...
,,M The court viewed this argument as unrealistic for two reasons. First, the
court said that most substitute situations involve handling new problems. Sec-
ond, the court stated that the burden of advising of the risks of a continued
course of treatment is minimal. 143 Even though the court asserted that most
substitute situations involve handling new problems, the court provided no au-
thority for this conclusion. Still; the court claimed that where there are new
problems the physician's duty to inform is unaffected. 4 4
The court's analysis is consistent with the doctrine of informed consent
and independent practitioners. 145 The general rule is that where an indepen-
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Haw. 188, 473 P.2d 116 (1970).
139. See supra text immediately following note 135.
140. No case law yet exists addressing the situation in which a patient becomes
upset upon disclosure and a substitute must decide whether to provide further disclo-
sure. Nevertheless, the scenario should be addressed because of the possibility that the
situation could occur.
141. See supra text immediately following note 135.
142. Leventhal, 132 Misc. 2d at 685, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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dent practitioner begins a new treatment the practitioner providing that treat-
ment has a duty to disclose the risks of that treatment. 14 6 No reason exists for
applying a different rule for substitutes who begin a treatment different from
that which was started by the original physician. If the original physician is
not starting the treatment, he should not be required to provide the disclo-
sure.1 47 If the patient is to be informed, that information must come from the
substitute.
Where, however, a treatment is merely being continued by tle covering
physician, perhaps a different rule should be applied.1 48 The court suggests
that no different rule should apply and the substitute still have a duty to dis-
close even though he is merely continuing the treatment originated by another
physician.1 49 The court's reasoning is that the burden of this further advise-
ment is minimal.18 0 The court's reasoning may not withstand careful scrutiny
when viewed with other considerations.
First, the burden of the substitute may be increased if he may no longer
rely on notations made by the original physician.15' While the Leventhal deci-
sion applies only to reliance on matters pertaining to disclosures, the court
might also apply the same reasoning to such matters as a patient's history or
prior health. Case law often develops when a particular holding of a court is
expanded by that court or other courts. Thus, what might begin as a holding
that physicians are not entitled to rely upon a doctor's medical records in mat-
ters pertaining to informed consent may develop as support for the proposition
that a physician is not entitled to rely upon any information contained in the
records of another physician.
The medical community must, of necessity, be able to rely on medical
records of other providers of health care to ensure the continuing care of pa-
tients. 52 A patient's health often depends on quick decisions, and rely on med-
ical records to make these decisions.1 53 A patient's health, or even life, could
be jeopardized if a physician had to take the time to discover for himself eve-
rything already contained in the medical records of another physician.' 5' The
146. Id.
147. See Prooth v. Wallsh, 105 Misc. 2d 603, 432 N.Y.S.2d 663 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1980).
148. See infra text following note 165 (discussing the possibility of holding the
substitute harmless when he is merely continuing a treatment initiated by the original
physician).
149. Leventhal, 132 Misc. 2d at 685, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
150. Id.
151. See supra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
152. In re Jascalevich License Revocation, 182 N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 455,
471, 442 A.2d 635, 643-44 (1981).
153. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
154. The harm to the patient which stems from the substitute's inability to rely
on the medical records of another physician is generally worse than the risk that medi-
cal records will contain inaccurate information. Incentives exist for the original physi-
cian to be completely accurate in making an entry into his records. The incentives
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substitute could again be faced with liability. The fact that the substitute
would be unable to rely on another doctor's records is, indeed, a burden that is
more than minimal.
A second reason why substitutes might become harder to find if liability
is imposed on them for failing to disclose risks of a continuing treatment is
based on the liability they incur if they frighten the patient.155 While the
chance of frightening a patient exists even where there is no substitute,156 the
chance would increase where there is a substitute continuing the treatment
started by another physician. 15 7 Some physicians might find this enlarged lia-
bility too much of a risk.1 58 Despite the Leventhal court's assertion, the burden
on the substitute might be more than minimal. 5 '
Until the Supreme Court of New York County handed down its decision
in Leventhal, there was no ruling concerning a substitute's duty to provide
disclosure."' 0 The Leventhal decision clearly established that a substitute, act-
ing as an independent practitioner, has a duty to disclose information pertinent
to the treatment.'' When taken in conjunction with the various legal relation-
include the realization that an incorrect entry could result in serious harm to the pa-
tient. In addition, a doctor exposes himself to tort liability if he is not accurate in his
entries. See Note, Admissibility of Hospital Records into Evidence, 21 MD. L. REv.
22, 27 (1967).
155. See supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
156. An overly anxious or easily frightened person who hears, even for the first
time, the risks of the treatment, could suffer mental anguish or no longer be able to
think rationally about proceeding with the treatment.
157. Under Leventhal the substitute can no longer rely on the original physi-
cian's notes. Because of this, the substitute would have to provide every disclosure nec-
essary. If the doctor has already provided the patient with the risks, this second dosage
of disclosure logically increases the chance of frightening the patient.
158. See Graddy v. New York Medical College, 19 A.D.2d 426, 243 N.Y.S.2d
940 (1963). "The implication of such an enlarged liability would tend to discourage a
physician from arranging to have another care for his patients on his illness or absence
and thus curtail the availability of medical service." Id. at 430, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 944-
45.
While this particular statement was in the context of holding the original physi-
cian liable for the misdeeds of the substitute, it seems equally applicable in the con-
verse of that situation. If a substitute cannot rely on the original physician's notations,
and, if the substitute is going to be held liable even though he is merely continuing the
treatment of an original physician, it is reasonable to believe that physicians would be
less willing to act as substitutes. This rationale, of course, would not apply to the sub-
stitute who begins, rather then continues, the treatment. Where the second physician
starts the treatment, he has a duty to disclose the relevant facts. See supra note 82 and
accompanying text.
159. The extent of the burden placed upon substitute physicians is directly re-
lated to the availability of those physicians. "[T]he medical profession insists that a
crisis exists ... [and] that doctors will give up their practice, or not treat certain at-
risk patients unless something is done to solve their dilemma." Another Medical Mal-
practice Crisis, N.J. LAW. J., August 15, 1985, at 4, col. 1.
160. See supra note 5.
161. Leventhal, 132 Misc. 2d at 684, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
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ships that physicians may enter into, the Leventhal decision provides a frame-
work for establishing the duty of a substitute in areas other than the indepen-
dent contractor.' 62
A substitute's duty may now be as follows. If the relationship between the
physicians is a partnership, or joint employees, the substitute will be liable if
the original physician fails to disclose the risks. The substitute is liable even if
he informs the patient of the risks because partners, and those jointly em-
ployed, are liable for each others' acts.1 3 If the relationship is one of master-
servant, the substitute may not have a duty to disclose as he is only doing what
someone else directs him to do.'" If the relationship is one of independent
practitioners, the substitute has a duty to inform, and, if he relies on the origi-
nal physician's notes, he does so at his own risk.' 65
While the above classifications appear to be the law after Leventhal, a
strong case can be made for adding a fourth classification. This category
would be made up from a division of the current Leventhal decision.
As it stands now, the Leventhal case does not make a distinction between
the substitute physician who starts a new treatment and the substitute physi-
cian who only continues a treatment started by another physician. The distinc-
tion would not matter where the physicians are jointly employed or are part-
ners. Physicians within the parameters of these categories are jointly liable.
Nor would it matter where a master-servant relationship is established because
the substitute is only doing what the original physician directs him to do. The
distinction, however, is important in the situation involving independent
practitioners.
Imposing a duty to inform upon a substitute who starts a new treatment,
yet not imposing that same duty upon the substitute who only continues a
treatment, is consistent with the doctrine of informed consent. It allows the
substitute who continues the treatment to rely on the original physician's
records, while insuring that the substitute who initiates the treatment provides
the requisite disclosure. Imposing a duty only upon the substitute who initiates
the treatment also decreases the likelihood that substitutes will be liable for
frightening the patient. This will have the added benefit of protecting the
availability of substitutes-protection essential for the assurance of medical
care.
GREGGORY DEAN GROVES
162. See supra note 71.
163. See supra notes 72-74.
164. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
165. Leventhal, 132 Misc. 2d at 684-85, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
[Vol. 53
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol53/iss1/12
